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Abstract
Major carbon-pricing systems in Europe and North America involve multiple
jurisdictions (countries or states). Individual jurisdictions often pursue additional
initiatives—such as unilateral carbon price floors, legislation to phase out coal,
aviation taxes or support programs for renewable energy—that overlap with the
wider carbon-pricing system. We develop a general framework to study how the
climate benefit of such overlapping policies depends on their design, location and
timing. Some policies leverage additional climate benefits elsewhere in the system
while others backfire by raising aggregate emissions. Our model encompasses almost
every type of carbon-pricing system used in practice.
Keywords : overlapping policy, internal carbon leakage, waterbed effect, cap-and-trade,
carbon pricing, hybrid regulation
JEL codes : H23 (externalities), Q54 (climate)
1 Introduction
The world is under increasing pressure to deliver on the ambition of the 2015 Paris Cli-
mate Agreement, and over 60 national and sub-national jurisdictions are putting a price
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on carbon emissions (World Bank, 2020). Two features of the carbon-pricing landscape
are striking. First, by using hybrid designs that combine elements of price and quantity
regulation, practice has run far ahead of the simple carbon tax and cap-and-trade poli-
cies emphasised by textbook economics. North American carbon markets—such as the
Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative (RGGI)—use price floors and ceilings to contain the
variability of the allowance price. Since its 2018 reform, the European Union’s Emissions
Trading System (EU ETS) features a complex allowance cancellation mechanism. Sec-
ond, major carbon-pricing systems involve multiple jurisdictions: the EU ETS covers 27
member states plus linked countries like Norway and the UK while RGGI involves ten
states in the northeastern United States.
Individual jurisdictions, in turn, often pursue unilateral climate initiatives that overlap
with the wider carbon-pricing system. The EU is a classic example, with individual
countries “doing more” than what is centrally provided by the EU ETS. The UK in 2013
introduced a carbon fee that adds £18/tCO2 to the allowance price faced by its power
generators under the EU ETS; the Netherlands are committed to introducing a similar
unilateral carbon price floor for electricity and industrial sectors.1 There is a plethora of
national policies to support renewable energy (notably solar and wind), and an increasing
number of countries are legislating to phase out coal-fired power and impose additional
carbon taxes on air travel.2 These examples share a common feature: they are policies
by an individual jurisdiction that operate alongside a wider carbon-pricing system.
Our question in this paper is simple: What is the climate benefit of such overlapping
policies? As it is a global public good, any mitigation of climate change will be driven
solely by changes in aggregate emissions. For a cap-and-trade system with a fixed emis-
sions cap, like the pre-2018 EU ETS, the answer is clear: if an overlapping policy reduces
EU-wide emissions demand (say, from power generation) by 1 ton of CO2, this will be
precisely offset by increased demand of 1 tCO2 elsewhere in the system—the “waterbed
effect” is 100%. At the opposite end, a simple carbon tax does not have an emissions cap
and so the waterbed effect is zero. Our main interest, therefore, is in real-world hybrid
carbon-market designs which typically feature dynamic “punctured” waterbeds that lie
between these two extremes. A punctured waterbed enables overlapping policies to have
a global climate benefit.
1The EU ETS includes power generation, industrial sectors, and domestic aviation and is the world’s
largest carbon-pricing system. The UK’s Carbon Price Support has been hailed as “perhaps the clearest
example in the world of a carbon tax leading to a significant cut in emissions” (New York Times, 2019).
2Under the EU’s 2009 Renewables Directive, each member state developed a national action plan
aimed at increasing the share of renewables in its energy mix. The Powering Past Coal Alliance currently
includes 34 national and 33 sub-national governments including twelve EU member states committed to
phasing out coal. Motivations for overlapping policies range from climate benefits to concerns about low
or volatile carbon prices to other market failures such as innovation externalities (Newbery et al., 2019).
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Yet this chain of reasoning still has a missing link which we refer to as “internal
carbon leakage”. Suppose that a unilateral Dutch carbon price on power generation
reduces its domestic emissions demand by 1 tCO2 but, within an integrated European
electricity market, this leads to an increase in Dutch electricity imports which in turn
raises emissions demand by 1 tCO2 in other EU ETS countries. This overlapping policy
has no climate benefit either: its rate of internal carbon leakage is 100%. This conclusion,
in turn, applies irrespective of the extent of the waterbed effect. In sum, the answer to
our question must be driven by a combination of the waterbed effect and internal leakage.
This paper provides a novel integrated approach through which to understand and
quantify the overall emissions impact of an overlapping policy that applies only to part
of a multi-jurisdiction carbon-pricing system. Section 2 presents a model-independent
conceptual framework that provides a mapping from the “local” emissions reduction the
overlapping policy achieves to its “global” impact which includes any knock-on effects
elsewhere in the system. Internal carbon leakage captures emissions displacement within
the system (e.g., greater product imports from a neighbouring country) for a given system-
wide carbon price. The waterbed effect endogenises the policy’s interaction with the
system’s carbon price (and any emissions cap).3
Section 3 introduces a theory of internal carbon leakage that focuses on emissions
displacement between different jurisdictions in the same sector. We consider two groups
of overlapping policies. First, “supply-side” policies that unilaterally raise the carbon
price or directly limit emissions-intensive production. Second, “demand-side” policies
that reduce the (residual) demand for emissions-intensive production, e.g., by promoting
renewables or introducing a carbon-consumption tax. We show that supply-side policies
feature positive internal carbon leakage—sometimes in excess of 100%—while demand-side
policies have negative internal leakage. While some recent empirical work has estimated
internal leakage for specific policies (Vollebergh, 2018; Abrell et al., 2019; Gerarden et al.,
2020), our first contribution is to provide new theoretical insight into the economics of
internal carbon leakage that applies across a range of commonly-used overlapping policies.4
Section 4 presents a general two-period analysis of the waterbed effect. While the
literature has studied the waterbed effect in specific circumstances, notably the EU ETS
(Fankhauser et al., 2010; Böhringer, 2014; Perino, 2018; Rosendahl, 2019a), there is still
very limited understanding of its operation across different types of hybrid carbon-market
designs. Our model encompasses price-based flexibility mechanisms based on past al-
3The strength and timing of the overlapping policy are exogenous in our framework; we are interested
in the extent to which a given local reduction in emissions demand translates into system-wide emissions
impacts for different overlapping policies and carbon-market designs.
4Internal carbon leakage as a result of overlapping policies has also been studied outside of the context
of a carbon-pricing system; see, e.g., Goulder and Stavins (2011) and Goulder et al. (2012) on interactions
between federal and state-level policies in the United States.
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lowance prices (including price ceilings and floors) (Roberts and Spence, 1976; Pizer,
2002; Newell et al., 2005; Borenstein et al., 2019; Burtraw et al., 2020), quantity-based
flexibility mechanisms based on past allowance banking as well as a simple carbon tax and
cap-and-trade.5 We uncover a natural connection between the extent of the waterbed and
classic principles from the literature on tax incidence (Jenkin, 1872; Weyl and Fabinger,
2013). Our second contribution, therefore, is to bring together results from prior litera-
ture in a unifying framework that covers almost every type of carbon-pricing system used
in practice, and connect them to simple economic principles.
Section 5 illustrates the empirical usefulness of the modelling framework. It derives
values for internal leakage and the waterbed effect using a combination of simple formulae
from our theory results and prior empirical work. We cover overlapping policies in Europe
and in North American carbon-pricing systems such as RGGI, the California-Québec car-
bon market, and Canada’s new federal minimum carbon price (see Figure 4). Consistent
with our theory, we find that supply-side (demand-side) overlapping policies have positive
(negative) internal leakage. Our findings illustrate how a policy’s overall climate benefit
varies widely depending on its design, location and timing. Section 6 concludes.6
We hope that our analysis, by providing practical guidance on the climate benefits
of 25 different combinations of overlapping policy instruments (see Figure 1) and types
of carbon-pricing designs (see Figure 3), will be of value to policymakers trying “in real
time” to gauge the attractiveness of domestic climate initiatives. A hybrid carbon-market
design raises the stakes for what are often termed “complementary” policies: some are
truly complementary in the sense that they induce further emissions reductions elsewhere
while others can backfire by raising aggregate emissions.7
Finally, while some of the economic issues are similar, our focus in this paper on inter-
nal leakage differs from the external carbon leakage to jurisdictions outside a unilateral
carbon-pricing system that has been the main concern of the literature (Fowlie, 2009;
Hanna, 2010; Kahn and Mansur, 2013; Martin et al., 2014; Aldy and Pizer, 2015; Caron
et al., 2015; Fowlie et al., 2016; Fischer et al., 2017; Fowlie and Reguant, 2018). This
research has examined situations where the scope of the product market is wider than
that of a carbon-pricing system; by contrast, we are interested in leakage among different
5A two-period model is necessary to be able to incorporate banking of allowances in a cap-and-trade
system which, in turn, can interact with the extent of the waterbed. We also derive an analytical waterbed
effect in a many-period representation of the EU ETS’s Market Stability Reserve.
6Formal proofs are in Appendix A (internal carbon leakage) and Appendix B (waterbed effect).
7Our analysis in this paper focuses on the emissions impacts of overlapping policies which is only
one—albeit important—component of a broader welfare analysis. Another salient aspect is the fiscal
cost of different policies; a unilateral carbon tax raises additional government revenue while a renewables
support program may be very costly. While we show some policies have much more favourable leakage
and waterbed properties than others, we do not formally rank them. Welfare analysis can build on the
results in our paper and is an important topics for future research on the economics of the environment.
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jurisdictions inside the system.8 The cement and steel industries are classic examples of
the former; our illustrations of the latter are drawn from airline and electricity markets.
2 Conceptual framework
We begin by setting out a simple conceptual framework that encompasses a wide range
of carbon-market designs and highlights the dual role of internal carbon leakage and the
waterbed effect in determining the climate benefits of different overlapping policies.
Consider a multi-jurisdiction carbon-pricing system that may cover a single sector
(like RGGI) or multiple sectors (like the EU ETS). An “overlapping policy”, in general,
is any unilateral policy that applies only to part of the system; our leading example is a
policy by a single jurisdiction that applies only to a subset of competing firms in a sector.
For simplicity, we consider two time periods, t = 1, 2, and think of the first period as the
short run and the second period as the long run.9 Denote by τ = (τ1, τ2) the system-wide
carbon price at each time, which is determined by the carbon-market design.
We are interested in unilateral policies by country (jurisdiction) i that, holding fixed
the carbon price path τ , are successful at reducing i’s domestic demand for emissions in
each period, ∆eit < 0, and hence also ∆ei ≡ ∆ei1 + ∆ei2 < 0 over time. Let ∆e∗t denote
the policy’s impact on aggregate emissions across all countries at time t at equilibrium
carbon prices (relative to a baseline without the unilateral policy). Our main question is,
what is the policy’s impact on long-run equilibrium emissions, ∆e∗ ≡ ∆e∗1 + ∆e∗2? This is
the critical issue for the policy’s effectiveness in combating climate change.
Our framework answers this question using two concepts: internal carbon leakage
and the waterbed effect. Internal leakage captures emissions displacement within the
system (e.g., greater product imports from a neighbouring country) for a given system-
wide carbon price. We define the rate of internal carbon leakage associated with i’s policy
at time t as:
Lit ≡ −∆e−it/∆eit, (1)
where ∆e−it is the change induced by i’s policy in the emissions demand of other countries
that are part of the carbon-pricing system.10 Therefore ∆et ≡ [1 − Lit]∆eit represents
8Another form of carbon leakage occurs when, in the same jurisdiction, some sectors are not covered
by the carbon-pricing system (Baylis et al., 2013; Jarke and Perino, 2017); an example is leakage from
covered EU ETS sectors like electricity to uncovered sectors such as transport.
9We use a two-period model to incorporate banking of allowances in a cap-and-trade system. The
logic of our framework otherwise also applies to a single-period setting.
10Notice that this is akin to the standard definition of “external” carbon leakage (e.g., IPCC, 2007)
that relates to shifting of emissions to jurisdictions outside the system.
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the (net) system-wide change in emissions demand at time t so ∆e ≡ ∆e1 + ∆e2 is the
long-run system-wide change in emissions demand due to the policy (for fixed τ ).
The waterbed effect then captures the system-wide impacts arising from any induced
changes to the equilibrium path of the system-wide carbon price. In particular, the extent
of the waterbed effect is defined according to the following expression:
W ≡ 1−∆e∗/∆e. (2)
This translates the system-wide change in emissions demand due to i’s policy into an
equilibrium change in overall emissions that incorporates any induced changes to the
carbon price path. A textbook cap-and-trade system with a fixed emissions cap has
W = 1 while a carbon tax has W = 0; real-world hybrid carbon-market designs typically
feature punctured waterbeds, W ∈ (0, 1).11
We can now state the central equation of our conceptual framework. Let βi ≡
∆ei1/∆ei ∈ [0, 1] denote the fraction of the policy’s domestic impact that occurs in the
first period, and define Li ≡ (βi[1− Li1] + (1− βi)[1− Li2]) as the policy’s weighted-
average rate of internal carbon leakage across the two periods. We can then write the
equilibrium change in long-run emissions as:
∆e∗ = [1− Li][1−W ]∆ei, (3)
which incorporates the equilibrium carbon price path via the waterbed effect. This shows
how internal carbon leakage and the waterbed effect together drive the sign and magnitude
of the overlapping policy’s impact on long-run equilibrium emissions, ∆e∗. Letting Ri ≡
[1− Li][1−W ], we can think of policies for which leakage and waterbed effects are such
that Ri ≥ 1 as complementary (or super-additive) policies while those for which Ri < 1
are substitutes (or sub-additive). If Ri < 0 substitutability is so strong that “global”
emissions rise (∆e∗ > 0) even though “local” emissions fall (∆ei < 0).
We do not attempt to quantify the policy’s impact on i’s domestic emissions demand,
∆ei < 0; rather we are interested in the mapping from a given policy-driven local impact
∆ei to the equilibrium global impact ∆e
∗. We also do not attempt to endogenise the
extent to which the policy operates in the short run or the long run, βi; rather we will
explore later the impact of βi on the extent of the waterbed effect. In short, we take the
unilateral policy’s size (∆ei) and its period-by-period timing (βi) as given, and ask to
what extent it translates into a long-run global climate gain.
Leveraging this conceptual framework, the remainder of the paper proceeds in three
11The latter include caps adjusted based on prices (Burtraw et al., 2020), taxes adjusted based on
(cumulative) emissions (Metcalf, 2020) and caps adjusted based on unused allowances (Newell et al.,
2005; Perino, 2018).
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steps. First, we derive the rate of internal carbon leakage Lit between different juris-
dictions in the same sector for a range of “supply-side” and “demand-side” overlapping
policies. Given the policy-timing parameter βi, these can be aggregated to give the av-
erage leakage rate Li. Second, given the policy’s induced changes to aggregate emissions
demand (∆e1,∆e2), we derive the extent of the waterbed effect W under different carbon-
market designs. Third, we illustrate the empirical usefulness of the framework by deriving
values for (Li,W ) for real-world overlapping policies in Europe and North America.
3 A model of internal carbon leakage
We next present a new theory of internal carbon leakage arising at the sectoral level
from unilateral policies within a wider carbon-pricing system. We consider two groups of
overlapping policies. First, “supply-side” policies that unilaterally raise the carbon price
for emissions-intensive production or directly reduce production, for example, by way of
a coal phase-out. Second, “demand-side” policies that reduce the (residual) demand for
emissions-intensive production, for example, by promoting renewables or energy efficiency
or introducing a carbon consumption tax. We show that the economics of internal carbon
leakage is similar for policies within each group but differs markedly across the two groups.
In the model, emissions-intensive firms in each of two countries decide on their produc-
tion volume and abatement effort. Countries can be heterogeneous in their technologies
along three dimensions: production costs, emissions intensities, and abatement opportu-
nities. The benchmark with fixed emissions intensities of production is nested as a special
case of the model, allowing us to clearly delineate the effects of abatement on internal
leakage. The unilateral policies overlap with a carbon price that is common across coun-
tries (jurisdictions) within the wider carbon-pricing system and—as motivated by the
conceptual framework—is held fixed.
For expositional convenience, we focus in the main text on a model in which produc-
tion costs and abatement costs are separable. This yields simple intuitive formulae for
the equilibrium rate of period-by-period internal carbon leakage Lit. The model is static
so time subscripts are omitted to simplify notation. In Appendix A, we solve the model
with general cost functions that allow non-separability between production and abate-
ment; Section 3.4 provides a summary of the additional effects that arise when abatement
decisions have an impact on the product-market equilibrium (and vice versa).
3.1 Model setup
There are two countries, i and j, where the latter can be interpreted as an aggregate
of all countries except i. A representative firm in each country k produces output xk
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(k = i, j) and the firms face a demand function p(X) for their product, where X ≡ xi+xj
is total output and p′(·) < 0. Firm k’s emissions are ek = e0k − ak where ak is abatement
and e0k = θkxk is baseline emissions in the absence of abatement for which its emissions
intensity of output is θk, which can be thought of as the “dirtiness” of the marginal plant
in country k.
Firm k has a cost function Gk(xk, ak) ≡ [Ck(xk) + φk(ak)], where Ck(xk) is its pro-
duction cost function and φk(ak) is its abatement cost function. For a well-behaved
solution, we make standard assumptions about cost convexity: Ck(0) = C
′
k(0) = 0,
C ′k(xk) > 0 for xk > 0, and C
′′
k (xk) > 0 as well as φ
′




It will be useful to have a simple metric for the extent of abatement opportunity for
firm k. To do so, we can think of its cost function in terms of output and emissions,

















∈ [0, 1). (4)
The limiting case with Ak → 1 corresponds to additional incremental abatement being
very cheap in that cost convexity φ′′k → 0. This means that output and emissions become
strongly detached: due to abatement, it is possible to reduce emissions without resorting
to output reductions. Conversely, the case in which Ak → 0 corresponds to a Leontief
technology: emissions are proportional to output (perfect complements) due to abatement
being infeasible, with φ′′k → ∞ and hence emissions remain at their baseline level, ek =
θkxk. We can therefore use Ak ∈ [0, 1) as a metric of firm k’s abatement opportunities.13
Firm k faces a carbon price τk(τ) on each unit of emissions, which depends on the
carbon price τ that is common to both countries as part of a wider carbon-pricing system.
As we shall see, a unilateral policy by country i that raises its domestic carbon price
leads to τi(τ) > τ ; otherwise τi(τ) = τ . As per our conceptual framework, the system-
wide carbon price τ itself is held fixed in this leakage analysis (and endogenised in our
subsequent waterbed analysis).
To maximise profits, firm k therefore solves maxxk,ak Πk = pxk−Gk(xk, ak)−τkek. Note
it is equivalent for a firm to choose its emissions or abatement. With perfect competition
12This kind of separable cost function can be interpreted as featuring an end-of-pipe technology which
cleans up production ex post. Examples include carbon capture and storage (CCS) and the purchase of
carbon offsets. Appendix A solves the model for general cost functions Gk(xk, ak) with a non-zero cross
partial, Gxak (xk, ak) 6= 0.




k − Gxek Gexk > 0. Firm k’s cost
function satisfies other standard assumptions made in environmental economics. Written in terms of




k > 0 , decreases in emissions,
Gek(xk, ek) = −φ′k < 0, and is convex in both output and emissions, with Gxxk (xk, ek) = C ′′k + θ2kφ′′k > 0




in the product market, the two first-order conditions for profit-maximisation are:
p(X)− C ′k(xk)− θkφ′k(ak) = 0 (5)
− τk + φ′k(ak) = 0. (6)
The product price equals the firm’s total marginal cost of output, and the carbon price
equals the marginal abatement cost. Putting these together yields a combined first-order
condition:
p(X)− C ′k(xk)− τkθk = 0 (7)
so product price is equal to the marginal cost of production plus per-unit carbon costs
based on its baseline emissions intensity of output. It does not depend on the extent of
abatement which, due to cost separability, does not affect the product-market outcome.
At an interior solution, k’s abatement incentive rises with its domestic carbon price,
dak/dτk = 1/φ
′′
k(·) > 0 which, in turn, is independent of output. To guarantee an interior
solution in the product market, we assume p(0) > maxk{C ′k(0) + τkθk}.
Our main interest lies in characterising the internal carbon leakage associated with
a unilateral policy introduced by country i alone. We assume, and later verify, that
the unilateral policy is successful at reducing i’s domestic emissions, ∆ei < 0. However,
through the product market, i’s unilateral policy may also induce changes in the behaviour
of the firm in country j—and hence also lead to a change in its emissions, ∆ej. (Given that
the system-wide carbon price is held fixed, changes in emissions and changes in emissions
demand are equivalent in our analysis of internal leakage.)
We define the rate of internal carbon leakage as Li ≡ (−∆ej/∆ei). In the benchmark
case without abatement, firms’ emissions intensities are fixed so carbon leakage is Li =
(θj/θi) (−∆xj/∆xi), where the first term is the “relative dirtiness” of firms and the second
term is output leakage, so also let LOi ≡ (−∆xj/∆xi). To simplify the analysis, as is
common practice, we focus on “marginal” unilateral policies for which the carbon-leakage
rate is approximated by Li ' (−dej/dei).14 That is, we consider a small deviation from
the initial equilibrium in which there is no unilateral policy.
Some equilibrium definitions will prove useful to cast our leakage formulae in familiar
terms. First, let εD ≡ −p(·)/Xp′(·) > 0 be the price elasticity of demand. Second, let σk ≡
xk/X ∈ (0, 1) be the market share of country k’s firm (so σi+σj = 1). Third, let Ĉ ′k(xk) ≡
[C ′k(xk) + τkθk] be k’s total marginal cost of output and define η
S
k ≡ xkĈ ′′k (xk)/Ĉ ′k(xk) > 0
as its elasticity, also noting that Ĉ ′′k (xk) ≡ C ′′k (xk).15 By k’s first-order condition, x′k(p) =
1/C ′′k (xk) > 0, i.e., its supply curve is upward-sloping. So ε
S
k ≡ px′k(p)/xk(p) > 0 is k’s
14In Section 3.4, we discuss the general case with non-marginal policy changes.
15Note that Ĉ ′k(xk) ≡ Gxk(xk, ak) where abatement is optimally chosen according to τk = φ′k(ak).
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price elasticity of supply and, at the firm’s optimum, ηSk = 1/ε
S
k . These expressions are
all evaluated at the output levels of the initial equilibrium without any unilateral policy.
3.2 “Supply-side” unilateral policies
We begin by considering two kinds of “supply-side” policies that unilaterally raise the
carbon price for emissions-intensive production or directly reduce production, for example,
by way of a coal phase-out. We will see that such policies have positive internal leakage
which, under some circumstances, can exceed 100%.
For concreteness, we can think of the demand curve p(X) as that of consumers in
country i who are served partly by domestic production and partly by imports from j.
This is a natural interpretation, for example, in the context of an integrated market for
electricity or in the context of aviation where i’s consumers have a choice of whether to
use an airport in i or j. Internal carbon leakage then captures the extent to which i’s con-
sumers are increasingly served by j’s producers. As will become clear, this interpretation
also facilitates the comparison between different types of unilateral policies.16
3.2.1 Unilateral carbon pricing
Our first overlapping policy λi imposes an additional carbon price only in country i.






τi(τ, λi) > 0.
A leading example is a unilateral carbon price floor designed to “top up” the system-
wide carbon price, τi = τ + λi, like for Great Britain’s Carbon Price Support for power
generation that runs alongside the EU ETS. Another possibility could be a unilateral
policy that seeks to lift i’s carbon price towards a higher target level τ̂i, say with τi =
τ + λi(τ̂i − τ). Our setup is general in that it allows the top-up to be non-uniform. Firm
j continues to be subject to the system-wide carbon price, τj = τ .
This policy leads to an asymmetric cost shock, inducing i’s firm to cut output and
emissions, dxi/dλi < 0 and dei/dλi < 0, but raising the “competitiveness” of its rival in j.
Since j’s carbon price remains unchanged, its abatement decision also stays unchanged so
dej/dλi = θj(dxj/dλi), and any change in its emissions is driven solely by output. Hence
the policy’s rate of internal leakage is signed by j’s output response.














16An alternative interpretation is that p(X) reflects aggregate consumer demand across both countries.
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Proposition 1 provides a simple formula to quantify internal carbon leakage. Carbon
leakage is always positive as the underlying output leakage is positive—due to the asym-
metric cost shock, i’s firm loses market share to j’s. Output leakage is always less than
100% as i’s policy raises the market price, i.e., there is positive carbon cost pass-through.
Yet carbon leakage can exceed 100% if j’s firm is sufficiently dirtier than i’s.
To understand the expression for Li, consider the benchmark with zero abatement by
i’s firm, Ai = 0. The comparative statics are intuitive: output leakage is more pronounced
where: (i) j’s market share is larger (higher σj), (ii) demand is relatively inelastic (lower
εD), and (iii) j’s firm is more supply-responsive, e.g., because of significant spare capacity
(higher εSj ). Output leakage then maps into carbon leakage by way of the relative emissions
intensity θj/θi, so is more pronounced if j has relatively dirtier production.
From a policy perspective, Proposition 1 formalises the rationale for a regional coalition
within the EU introducing a carbon price floor (Newbery et al., 2019): this combines
greater market share than single-country action and thereby contains internal leakage.
Greater abatement opportunities by country i, as measured by a higher value of Ai > 0,
mitigate internal carbon leakage. Abatement breaks the direct link between output and
emissions; for a given output contraction by i—and resulting competitive gain by j—
domestic emissions fall by more. In the limit, with near-costless additional abatement,
carbon leakage tends to zero—even if it may have been very high without any abatement
(i.e., Li → 0 as Ai → 1 as φ′′i (·)→ 0).
Finally, observe that the formula for Li does not depend on the precise functional form
of the carbon price in country i τi = τi(τ, λi); at the margin, this matters for the absolute
output and emissions impacts but not for the relative effects—which is what our leakage
rate for a marginal policy captures.
To get a sense for magnitudes, it is helpful to consider a numerical example. Suppose
that the demand elasticity εD = 1
2
and that j has have market share σj = 20% with a
supply-responsiveness determined by a modest cost elasticity ηSk = .2 ⇔ εSj = 5. These
parameter values might be plausible in the context of electricity markets in which country
i imports some of its consumption from generators located in j. As a baseline, countries
have identical emissions intensities, θi = θj, and there is no abatement, Ai = 0. Then
we find internal carbon leakage Li = 67%, driven solely by output leakage. Now suppose
instead that j’s firm is twice as dirty (which approximates emissions from coal vs gas-fired
generation); then internal leakage also doubles to Li = 133%. Finally, let country i have
significant abatement opportunity as implied by Ai =
1
4
, with the same supply elasticity
εSi = 5. This yields a large drop in internal leakage back down to Li = 60%, showing how
abatement can help bring forth an overall emissions reduction.
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3.2.2 Unilateral reduction in carbon-intensive production
Our second policy has country i institute a unilateral reduction in carbon-intensive pro-
duction. A topical example of such a policy is a phase-out of coal-fired power generation,
which a number of European countries have individually committed to—again alongside
these plants being covered by the EU ETS. Formally, we suppose that i’s policy λi im-
poses a (marginal) reduction in i’s output, dxi < 0. In contrast to the previous policy,
this policy does not affect the carbon price faced by i’s firm so τk = τ for k = i, j.
The economics of internal carbon leakage is similar to the first policy: the unilateral
reduction in i’s production leads to a degree of output leakage, as j’s firm “fills the gap”
in market supply, which then translates into carbon leakage. An important difference,
however, is that the reduction in carbon-intensive production is directly mandated by
policy rather than induced in equilibrium by i’s unilateral carbon price—and therefore
does not incentivise any abatement.
Proposition 2 A unilateral reduction in carbon-intensive production by country i has





(σj + εD/εSj )
> 0.
The formula of Proposition 2 is a special case of Proposition 1 in which country i’s
abatement is zero. Like before, the rate of output leakage satisfies LOi = σj/(σj+ε
D/εSj ) ∈
(0, 1), with intuitive properties, and this translates into carbon leakage by way of the
relative emissions intensity θj/θi. It is also clear that, overall, a unilateral reduction in
carbon-intensive production has less attractive internal leakage than a unilateral carbon
price: the absence of induced abatement means that a key factor that can mitigate carbon
leakage is not present.
With our earlier parameter values, σj = 20%, ε
D = 1
2
, εSj = 5 and θi = θj, we again
find Li = 67%. If j’s technology is less responsive with η
S
j = 1 ⇔ εSj = 1 or market
demand is more elastic with εD = 21
2
, then leakage falls considerably to Li = 28%.
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3.3 “Demand-side” unilateral policies
We now turn to three “demand-side” policies that reduce the (residual) demand for
emissions-intensive production: promoting zero-carbon renewables, an energy-efficiency
17Our exposition here is in terms of unilateral action by one country within a multi-jurisdiction carbon-
pricing system. An alternative interpretation is that i and j are players within a single jurisdiction. Then
Proposition 2 derives within-country internal carbon leakage from coal-fired generation to, say, gas-fired
generation in response to a (policy-induced) cut in the former.
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program, and a carbon-consumption tax. We will see that these have markedly different
properties from supply-side policies: their internal carbon leakage is negative.
We retain the interpretation that the demand curve reflects that of consumers in
country i who are served partly by domestic production and partly by imports from j.




p(X;λi) < 0 so the unilateral policy reduces demand, and the residual
demand of i’s firms—but also that of j’s firms. Both firms continue to face the common
carbon price τi = τj = τ .
The policies fit into this setup as follows. First, for i’s renewables support program, we
write demand as p(X;λi) = p(X + λi) where λi is the volume of zero-carbon renewables
production supported by the policy. Second, for the energy-efficiency program, write
direct demand as D(p;λi) = (1 − λi)D(p) so it reduces demand by a fraction λi (for
a given p) and hence p(X;λi) = D
−1 (X/(1− λi)). Third, for the carbon-consumption
tax, write demand as p(X;λi) = [p(X)− λiθi] where the tax λi is levied on consumption
according to i’s baseline emissions intensity θi. In all three cases,
∂
∂λi
p(X;λi) < 0 at an
interior equilibrium.
Proposition 3 The unilateral policies by country i of (i) a renewables support program
that brings in additional zero-carbon production, (ii) an energy-efficiency program that
reduces demand for carbon-intensive production, and (iii) a carbon consumption tax have









Internal carbon leakage is always negative: j’s firm is now directly affected by the pol-
icy and responds by also cutting output and emissions. This means that the “global”
emissions reduction here is more pronounced than the “local” reduction. Akin to Propo-
sitions 1 and 2, leakage is more strongly negative where j’s firm is dirtier, more supply-
responsive and has greater market share. In addition, it is more pronounced if i’s own
supply-responsiveness is weaker; then i’s output contraction is smaller relative to j’s. As
the carbon price remains fixed for both countries, unilateral action here brings no extra
abatement incentive (i.e., dak/dλi = 0 for k = i, j).
Proposition 3’s internal leakage rate does not depend on any demand characteristics,
including the precise form of p(X;λi) and the demand elasticity ε
D. To first order,
for a marginal policy, the reduction in i’s production—and hence also of i’s emissions
is proportional to ∂
∂λi
p(X;λi). To first order, this is also true for the changes in j’s
production and emissions. So the relative magnitude of emissions changes, as captured by
the leakage rate, does not depend on ∂
∂λi
p(X;λi)—and so all three demand-side unilateral
13
policies have identical leakage properties.




j , yields internal
carbon leakage of Li = −25%. If, instead, j’s firms are twice as dirty or twice as supply-
responsive than i’s, leakage doubles in absolute terms to Li = −50%. With both θj/θi = 2
and εSj /ε
S
i = 2, internal leakage becomes Li = −100%, and so the “global” reduction in
emissions demand is now twice the size of the “local” reduction.
Summarising our analysis thus far, Figure 1 graphically illustrates the key differences
in rates of internal carbon leakage across different overlapping policies.
Figure 1: Internal carbon leakage for different types of unilateral climate policies
Notes: Based on Propositions 1-3 and parameter values σj = 20%, ε




j = 5, Ai =
1
4 , and
using three different values of the relative emissions intensity θj/θi.
3.4 Extensions and robustness
Different types of unilateral action can yield very different outcomes in terms of inter-
nal carbon leakage. Three overarching drivers of leakage are (i) the countries’ relative
baseline emissions intensities, θj/θi (ii) output leakage as driven by market shares and
demand/supply elasticities, LOi and (iii) the potential for emissions abatement, Ai, Aj.
18
We next develop some general intuition for internal leakage, and then discuss the
implications of non-separability of cost functions and of our focus on marginal policies as
well as an alternative definition of internal carbon leakage.
18A unifying feature across all our unilateral policies is that internal carbon leakage tends to zero where
either j’s market share is tiny, σj → 0, j is supply-unresponsive, εSj → 0, or j is already zero-carbon,
θj/θi → 0. In the first two cases, output leakage is zero; in the third, the change in j’s emissions is zero.
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General intuition. We begin with a model-independent decomposition that confirms
how the drivers of internal leakage from our simple equilibrium model are more generally
applicable. Consider any (marginal) unilateral policy dλi that is successful at reducing
country i’s domestic emissions, dei/dλi < 0. Recalling that firm k’s emissions ek = e
0
k−ak,












where LOi = (dxj/dλi)/(−dxi/dλi) is output leakage and αi ≡ (dai/dλi)/(−de0i /dλi) ≥ 0
and αj ≡ (daj/dλi)/(de0j/dλi) are market-based measures of the extent of abatement,
relative to the change in baseline emissions, by the two countries.19
This expression shows how internal carbon leakage is generally driven by the same three
factors identified in our simple model: relative emissions intensities, output leakage, and
abatement effects. Moreover, it remains true that (i) output leakage typically determines
the sign of carbon leakage, (ii) a positive leakage rate is mitigated by firms’ abatement
opportunities, and (iii) the relative baseline emissions intensity acts as a scaling factor. So
these qualitative properties from our simple model are robust in a more general context.
Non-separable technology. A simplifying assumption is that firm k’s cost function
Gk(xk, ak) ≡ [Ck(xk) + φk(ak)] has a zero cross-partial, Gxak (xk, ak) = 0, so output and
abatement decisions are independent. Separability is a common assumption but also
restrictive. For a general cost function Gk(xk, ak) the first-order conditions are p = G
x
k +
τkθk and τk = G
a
k. An immediate implication is that abatement can now be induced by
changes to output (via Gxak 6= 0) so is no longer solely tied to the carbon price.
Consider our supply-side policy of a unilateral reduction in emissions-intensive pro-












k ) > 0 captures the extent of non-
separability.20 If δk < 1⇔ Gxak < 0 (k = i, j), given the rate of output leakage LOi , j tends
to abate more given its output increase—which pushes internal leakage down; at the same
time, however, i’s output reduction undermines its abatement incentive—which pushes
internal leakage up. Output leakage LOi itself is more pronounced than for a separable
technology. If Gxaj < 0, then abatement raises the marginal return to output, and vice
19Note that αk = 0 if and only if Ak = 0 in terms of our earlier measure of abatement.
20The property δk > 0 corresponds to abatement increasing k’s optimised marginal cost of production.
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versa, so, all else equal, j’s output increase is more pronounced. The same logic applies
in reverse for Gxaj > 0: abatement makes output less attractive, and vice versa. Hence,
across both cases, the non-separability effect raises j’s marginal return to output—so
output leakage LOi is higher for G
xa
j 6= 0, all else equal, than for Gxaj = 0.
Internal carbon leakage for the three demand-side policies (Proposition 3) is affected
by non-separability in a similar way. For these, the impact on the rate of output leakage
LOi is ambiguous as both countries now experience a direct change on their marginal
return to output. Output leakage, all else equal, will be exacerbated—that is, become
more negative—if the non-separability effect is stronger for j. Given output leakage, the
same two contrasting effects as above are again at play (via δj/δi). The other supply-side
policy of a unilateral carbon price (Proposition 1), in addition to these effects, features
the familiar carbon-price-induced abatement by i.
In sum, the overarching insight from our simple model with separability is robust:
demand-side policies have negative internal leakage while supply-side policies do not.
Non-marginal policy. Our analysis has focused on marginal unilateral policies that shift
the equilibrium by a small amount, via the approximation Li ≡ 4ej−4ei '
dej
−dei . Clearly, this
is a good approximation if changes in policy are relatively modest; how good is it more
generally? As we have seen, marginal rates of internal leakage depend on first-order deriva-
tives of demand (via the demand elasticity) and second-order derivatives of cost functions
(via supply elasticities and abatement opportunities). This is true in our simple model
but also more generally with additional second-order cost terms due to non-separability.
The key point is that the non-marginal leakage rate will be similar to marginal leakage
as long as either second-order demand terms and third-order cost terms are small. This
obtains exactly if the demand curve is linear (p′(X) is constant) and the cost functions are




k all constant). In such cases, we have





















−dei since the marginal leak-
age rate is constant with respect to λi. Given the ubiquity of linear-quadratic models in
economics, this suggests that our simple formulae should be acceptable approximations
to more complex non-marginal leakage rates. The simple formulae contain no obvious
bias; they could be an over- or underestimate depending on whether demand is convex or
concave and on the precise higher-order properties of cost functions.
Finally, we should point out that the equivalence of our three demand-side policies in
terms of internal leakage (Proposition 3) is tied to marginal changes; this, in effect, implies
that the three policies are identically-sized and therefore directly comparable. If these
unilateral policies had different “sizes” in terms of the non-marginal policy change 4λi ≡∫ λi
0 dλi > 0, then their leakage properties are no longer necessarily identical. However,
they would remain identical if, as per the previous argument, the rate of internal carbon
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leakage is itself invariant as in a linear-quadratic model.
“Total” internal carbon leakage with an endogenous allowance price. As mo-
tivated by our conceptual framework, our leakage analysis has taken the system-wide
carbon price τ as given and fixed; our subsequent waterbed analysis will endogenise the
allowance price for a cap-and-trade system. An alternative definition of “total” internal


















where typically dek/dτ < 0 for k = i, j. For a carbon tax, the two leakage concepts are
equivalent, LTi = Li, as then dτ/dλi = 0 (no waterbed effect). For cap-and-trade systems,
depending on the details of the unilateral policy, we instead have dτ/dλi 6= 0 so there can
be a wedge between LTi and Li.
Consider a demand-side unilateral policy and suppose that countries have identical
emissions intensities θi = θj. From the viewpoint of firm k, it is equivalent for its demand
to decline by a small amount or its cost to increase by a small amount; the demand-side
policies, as we have seen, have a symmetric impact on both countries and, since θi = θj,
this is also true for the system-wide change in τ—so we have that LTi = Li < 0. By
contrast, if θi > θj then also L
T
i < Li (and vice versa). For supply-side unilateral policies,
we typically have Li > 0 so expect that total leakage is lower than our measure, L
T
i < Li.
In sum, supply-side unilateral policies will typically, if not always, look better in terms
of total internal carbon leakage than with a fixed carbon price while the wedge between
the measures is more detail-dependent for demand-side policies. In general, as long as
dτ/dλi ' 0 for i’s policy, we expect that the two concepts give similar results, LTi ' Li.
4 A model of the waterbed effect
We now derive the second building block of our conceptual framework: the waterbed effect
W = 1−∆e∗/∆e of overlapping policies under a wide range of real-world carbon-pricing
schemes. The carbon price path τ that was treated as given in Section 3 is now derived
endogenously.
Consider a stylised two-period model of an intertemporal allowance market. By design,
the allowance market is geographically blind. The policy’s impact is thus represented by
∆e and β, where ∆e = [1 − Li]∆ei is the total change in allowance demand at a given
carbon price and β = ∆e1/∆e is the fraction of this impact that is effective in period 1.
21
21We can write β = βi[1−Li1]βi[1−Li1]+(1−βi)[1−Li2] to express it in terms of previous timing and leakage
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We assume a baseline inverse aggregate demand function for allowances ρt(et) where
et are aggregate emissions in period t = 1, 2 and so ρ1 (e1 − β∆e) and ρ2 (e2 − (1− β)∆e)
are the post-intervention inverse demands. Again, we focus on marginal unilateral poli-
cies overlapping the carbon-pricing scheme. We assume that any overlapping policy is
announced at the beginning of period 1, regardless of the timing of its impacts. Hence,
policy impacts are perfectly anticipated by all market participants. We restrict attention
to markets with perfect intertemporal arbitrage in which any borrowing and banking con-
straints do not bind, i.e., that τ2 = (1 + r)τ1. For a carbon tax or a binding price corridor
(i.e., a combination of a price floor and a price ceiling), the interest rate r reflects an
exogenous increase in the carbon price.
We first analyse how an anticipated shift in allowance demand affects total emis-
sions and the equilibrium price of allowances when the carbon-pricing scheme features
a (weakly) increasing allowance supply function. Then we consider a design where the
long-run cap is adjusted based on banked allowances as has been the case in the EU ETS
since the 2018 reform (Perino, 2018). Due to peculiar design features that cannot be fully
captured by a two-period model, we conclude this section by taking a closer look at the
EU ETS’s Market Stability Reserve.22
4.1 Flexibility mechanisms based on past allowances prices
We begin with flexibility mechanisms based on past allowance prices that specify variations
of (weakly) upward-sloping allowance supply curves.23 A carbon tax, a plain cap-and-
trade system with a fixed cap as well as carbon price floors and ceilings are all special
cases. Hence, these mechanisms include most carbon-pricing designs observed in the
real world such as the California-Québec scheme and RGGI (Burtraw et al., 2020), the
pre-2018 EU ETS (Perino and Willner, 2016), and all carbon taxes.24
variables. Note that β = 0 if βi = 0 and β = 1 if βi = 1. Depending on the rates of internal carbon
leakage in each period, β can be negative or exceed 100%. For all demand side policies and for supply-
side policies in relatively dirty countries (i.e., Lit < 1 for both periods) the country-specific and the
aggregate variables are positively related. A constant leakage rate (Li1 = Li2 = Li) implies β = βi and
∆e = ∆ei1(1− Li)/βi.
22In this section we restrict attention to cap adjustments brought about by formally codified flexibility
mechanisms. On top of that unilateral policies might impact future caps by changing the outcome
of future political negotiations about the stringency of the carbon-pricing system.Newell et al. (2005);
Kuusela and Lintunen (2020); Pizer and Prest (2020) present models of policy updating but do not
explicitly discuss the impact of unilateral policies on the political economy of re-negotiations.
23Such mechanisms have been described, among others, by Roberts and Spence (1976); Unold and
Requate (2001); Pizer (2002); Newell et al. (2005); Hepburn (2006); Burtraw et al. (2020) and Traeger et
al. (2020). In principle our model can also capture downward-sloping allowance supply curves. However,
both from an environmental and an economic perspective, we are not aware of any arguments in their
favour; nonetheless, the next subsection shows that—at least implicitly—they do exist.
24The Emissions Assurance Mechanism proposed by Metcalf (2020) adjusts tax rates based on cumula-
tive emissions. It therefore specifies prices as a function of quantities rather than quantities as a function
18
Allowance supply is given by a fixed number of allowances s1 issued in period 1 and
a flexible number of allowances, s2(τ1), issued in period 2 with ∂s2/∂τ1 ≥ 0. A cap-and-
trade scheme with a fixed cap or any vertical section of an allowance supply curve are
represented by ∂s2/∂τ1 = 0. A carbon tax or a horizontal section of an allowance supply
curve, such as a price floor, are represented by ∂s2/∂τ1 being perfectly price elastic at a
particular τ̄1.
25
The three equilibrium conditions of this carbon-market design are:
ρ1(e1 − β∆e1)− τ1 = 0 (11)
ρ2(e2 − (1− β)∆e2)− (1 + r)τ1 = 0 (12)
e1 + e2 − s1 − s2(τ1) = 0, (13)
where (11) and (12) balance marginal costs of abatement with the carbon price for periods
1 and 2, respectively, while (13) is the market-clearing condition for the allowance market.
Using Cramer’s rule and the implicit function theorem (see Appendix B), the equilib-














where ∂e/∂τ1 < 0 is the slope of the total allowance demand curve. The change in
the equilibrium allowance price is key to identify the waterbed effect. (It also allows to
compute total internal carbon leakage that incorporates the induced price change; see
Section 3.4). Temporal and geographical distributions of the change in allowance demand
are irrelevant. Note that the former is in stark contrast to what we find for flexibility
mechanisms based on past banking in subsection 4.2. Adjustments in total equilibrium























of prices. While the formal representation would slightly differ from the setup used below, qualitatively
the mechanisms mimics a flexibility mechanism based on past allowances prices.
25Then the mechanism fixes prices at τ1 = τ̄1 and τ2 = (1 + r)τ̄1. Furthermore, if we interpret r not
as the rate of time preference but as a policy parameter, i.e. the tax rate escalator, it captures all cases
of period-specific linear tax schemes.
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where κD > 0 and κS ≥ 0 are the long-run elasticities of allowance demand and supply.
Proposition 4 The waterbed effect for a marginal policy overlapping a carbon-pricing
scheme with a (weakly) increasing allowance supply and strictly decreasing allowance de-
mand is:













∈ [0, 1], (17)
which is independent of the specifics of the overlapping policy (∆eit, βi) and leakage rates
(Lit).
Proposition 4 shows that the waterbed effect depends only on characteristics of total
allowance demand and supply—and is independent of the type of overlapping policy, its
temporal and geographical impacts, and its internal carbon leakage.
Equation (17) has at opposite ends of the spectrum a zero waterbed for a carbon
tax (∂s2/∂τ1 → ∞) and a 100% waterbed effect under a plain cap-and-trade system
(∂s2/∂τ1 = κ
S = 0). In a deterministic setting and for marginal changes, i.e., policies in-
ducing relatively small shifts in allowance demand, this conclusion applies also to stepwise
allowance supply functions featured in the California-Québec scheme and RGGI. If the
initial equilibrium is in a vertical (horizontal) section of the supply curve, the waterbed
effect is 100% (zero).
Once larger interventions are considered—such that allowance demand moves across
one or several kinks in the supply schedule—none of the extreme cases appropriately
capture the impact on supply. The average waterbed effect of a large-scale policy can
be computed by integrating over the marginal effects.26 The expected waterbed effect of
marginal changes is in the intermediate range if at the time of passing legislation for an
overlapping policy future market outcomes are still uncertain.27 If the probability that
any of the price bounds binds is π, then E(W ) = π. Ex-post the waterbed effect is either
zero or 100%. As in the case with strictly upward-sloping allowance supply curves, the
waterbed effect then increases in the elasticity of allowance demand (κD) and decreases
in the elasticity of allowance supply (κS).
Proposition 4 also uncovers a natural connection between the waterbed effect and
classic principles from the literature on tax incidence (Jenkin, 1872; Weyl and Fabinger,
2013). In particular, note that condition (17) corresponds to the cost pass-through rate
from the tax-incidence literature. Since the allowance supply is assumed to be (weakly)
26The impact of a small change in the ambition of a large policy is again accurately described by
marginal analysis.
27See Borenstein et al. (2019) for an assessment of such uncertainties in the California carbon market.
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monotonically increasing, it mimics a supply curve. The drop of producer prices in re-
sponse to a tax-induced shift in inverse demand in the tax-incidence literature exactly
mimics the impact of an overlapping policy on the carbon price in a carbon market with
a weakly upward-sloping allowance supply curve.28
4.2 Flexibility mechanisms based on past allowance banking
With the 2018 reform of the EU ETS, namely the introduction of cancellations within
the Market Stability Reserve, an entirely new form of flexibility mechanism entered the
scene. Here we present a stylised two-period version of such a mechanism. It adjusts the
long-run cap based on the number of allowances banked for future use in early periods,
s2(b) where b = s1 − e1 is banking at the end of period 1 and ∂s2/∂b ∈ [−1, 0].29 A plain
cap-and-trade scheme is again included as a special case (∂s2/∂b = 0).
The responsiveness of the adjustment mechanism, given by ∂s2/∂b, allows the wa-
terbed effect to deviate from 100%. However, in contrast to the price-based flexibility
mechanism, the waterbed effect here is not fully determined by the mechanism and the
slope of allowance demand. Given both pre-intervention allowance demand functions and
∂s2/∂b, the waterbed effect can still take virtually any value, driven by the timing of the
impact of the overlapping policy. Depending on whether it occurs in period 1 or 2, a given
shift in total allowance demand has very different impacts on first-period allowance bank-
ing. As banking balances temporal differences in allowance scarcity, it is thus intuitive
that the waterbed effect depends on the timing of demand shifts.
Analogous to the price-based flexibility mechanism, the equilibrium conditions are:
ρ1(e1 − β∆e)− τ1 = 0 (18)
ρ2(e2 − (1− β)∆e)− (1 + r)τ1 = 0 (19)
e1 + e2 − s1 − s2(s1 − e1) = 0. (20)
Cramer’s rule and the implicit function theorem (see Appendix B) yield the response of
28The trade-off between the price and quantity response due to an exogenous shift in allowance demand
is also at the heart of instrument choice (Weitzman, 1974). Phrased in the terms of our model, Weitzman’s
famous criterion states that a waterbed effect of zero (plain tax) is preferred over a waterbed effect of
100% (plain cap-and-trade) if and only if the slope of marginal damages from emissions is larger than
the slope of firms’ allowance demand. This serves as a reminder that a waterbed effect of zero is not
necessarily preferred on welfare grounds.
29Restricting ∂s2/∂b > −1 is somewhat arbitrary as one could imagine schemes with more responsive
rules. However, imposing this lower bound simplifies the analysis and includes the entire range of values
relevant for the EU ETS. For details see Lemma 1.
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The sign of the first term is unambiguously positive (noting that ∂s2/∂b ∈ [−1, 0] and
(∂e1/∂τ1)/(∂e/∂τ1) ∈ (0, 1)). The sign of the term in brackets, however, depends on
the relative size of the fraction of the demand reduction impacting period 1 (β) and
the indirect effect caused by the adjustment in the equilibrium price (∂e1/∂τ1)/(∂e/∂τ1).
The latter determines how emissions changes triggered by a price change are distributed
across periods in a market with perfect intertemporal arbitrage. Phrased in terms of short
and long-run elasticities, the term in brackets is more likely to be positive the smaller
the difference between the short (κD1 ) and long-run (κ
D) price elasticity of allowance
demand. Put in terms of features of the overlapping policy, if the reduction in allowance
demand is sufficiently frontloaded, equilibrium emissions in period 1 decrease. Recall that
∆e < 0, i.e., a positive sign of (21) implies that e∗1 decreases if the policy’s impact is more
pronounced. Hence, in contrast to price-based flexibility mechanisms, the timing of policy
impacts matters.
A similar argument also holds for the change in total equilibrium emissions e∗ via































Again, policies mainly reducing allowance demand early on reduce the long-run cap. Those
reducing allowance demand in the distant future tend to increase it.30
Proposition 5 The waterbed effect for a marginal, anticipated policy overlapping a carbon-
pricing scheme with a flexibility mechanism based on past allowance banking is:














where the numerator captures the direct impact of the overlapping policy (Perino, 2018)
and the denominator the indirect effect mediated through the price response (Rosendahl,
2019b). Recalling that β = [1 + (1 − Li2)/(1 − Li1) · (1 − βi)/βi]−1 makes apparent that
30Note that the increase in allowances triggered by the overlapping policy does not require that the
flexibility mechanism actually creates additional allowances. It might merely reflect a reduction in the
number of allowances cancelled compared to the reference scenario without the overlapping policy.
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the waterbed effect depends on the temporal structure of the overlapping policy (βi) and
its internal carbon leakage (Li1, Li2). Several special cases are worth highlighting:
(i) A unilateral policy effective only in period 1 (β = 1) has a waterbed effect unam-










∈ (0, 1). (24)
(ii) A unilateral policy effective only in period 2 (β = 0) has a waterbed effect unam-










(iii) For any given change in total allowance demand ∆e < 0, there exists a threshold
β = (∂e1/∂τ1)/(∂e/∂τ1) ∈ (0, 1) for which W = 1. For all β < β, W > 1 and vice
versa. The larger the difference between short and long-run responsiveness (price
elasticity) of allowance demand, the lower β.
(iv) An overlapping policy features a negative waterbed effect, W < 0, if it reduces aggre-
gate allowance demand in period 1 and across both periods but sufficiently increases
it in period 2 (β > 1,∆e < 0,∆e1 < 0,∆e2 > 0) according to:




In sum, there are three regimes for the waterbed effect:
W =

< 0 if β > β̄ ≥ 1
∈ [0, 1] if β ≤ β ≤ β̄
> 1 if β < β ∈ (0, 1)
.
Proposition 5’s equation (23) captures two opposing effects: the direct and the price-
mediated indirect effect on long-run emissions. The former is represented by the second
term in the numerator, the latter by the second term in the denominator. The two
special cases presented in parts (i) and (ii) highlight the two effects. For policies affecting
aggregate demand early on (see Equation (24)), the price effect is always of second order
and the waterbed is punctured (Perino, 2018). However, policies affecting aggregate
demand only in the far future (Equation (25)) have no direct impact—and hence the
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price-driven effect in the denominator of Equation (23) dominates. Ceteris paribus, such
policies increase the supply of allowances, i.e., they refill the waterbed—the “Rosendahl
effect”.31 Anticipation of a future reduction in relative scarcity reduces the incentives to
bank allowances, and the drop in the bank reduces the number of allowances cancelled by
the flexibility mechanism.
In sum, for a given quantity-based flexibility mechanism (∂s2/∂b) and given mar-
ket characteristics (ρ1(e1), ρ2(e2)), an overlapping policy with a given impact on total
allowance demand (∆e), can increase total emissions (W > 1), leave them unaffected
(W = 1), decrease them (W < 1), and even decrease them by more than the initial shift
in aggregate demand (W < 0)—all driven exclusively by the timing of the policy’s impact
on aggregate allowance demand (β). This in turn implies that the waterbed effect is also
a function of changes over time in internal carbon leakage32 and that for any given change
in total allowance demand, there is a variant of the unilateral policy distinguished only
by the temporal distribution of demand shifts that features a waterbed effect of 100%
(case (iii) in Proposition 5). Both points are in stark contrast to price-based flexibility
mechanisms where policy timing and internal leakage were irrelevant (Proposition 4). An
example for a policy featuring a negative waterbed (case (iv) in Proposition 5) is an
amendment of a previously enacted coal phase-out plan that shuts down old inefficient
plants earlier but grants new, highly-efficient plants a longer grace period.
Figure 2 illustrates Proposition 5. The horizontal distance between inverse demand
curves (red) represents the total change in the aggregate demand for allowances at a given
carbon price (∆e). Three variants of the overlapping policy are presented that differ only
in the timing of impacts (β). They occur either only in period 1 (β = 1), only in period
2 (β = 0), or a substantial decrease in demand is followed by a smaller increase (β > β̄).
Supply responses (blue) are starkly different: for β = 1 the waterbed effect is around 0.1,
for β = 0 around 1.4, and for β > β̄ it is −.2 . The three dashed purple curves connect
market equilibria for a continuum of demand shocks. Hence, they can be interpreted
as effective supply curves indicating how equilibrium prices and quantities respond to
variations in the inverse aggregate emissions demand curve.
Based on these effective supply curves, Corollary 1 shows formally how the results of
our earlier Proposition 4—and hence of the literature on tax incidence—can be transferred
to banking-based flexibility mechanisms. There are two qualifications. First, one needs
to compute the effective supply curve for each and every overlapping policy separately
31This effect was first described by Rosendahl (2019b) and confirmed by Bruninx et al. (2019); Gerlagh
et al. (2019); Pahle et al. (2019); Rosendahl (2019a). For a discussion see Perino (2019). Rosendahl
(2019a) and Gerlagh et al. (2019) refer to it as a “green paradox”.
32Numerical simulations of different policies using calibrated models can be found in Bruninx et al.
(2019); Gerlagh et al. (2019); Osorio et al. (2020); Pahle et al. (2019) and Rosendahl (2019a).
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Figure 2: Waterbed effect for a banking-based flexibility mechanism
Notes: Shift in total allowance demand (∆e, red) induced by overlapping policy; supply response (blue);
temporal distribution of the impact (β); response to continuum of demand shifts (dotted purple) with β
fixed.
and, second, these curves might be strictly downward-sloping which allows for waterbed
effects above 100% and below zero.
Corollary 1 Propositions 4 and 5 are equivalent when considering the equilibrium ex-



























See Appendix B for a proof.
The equilibrium expansion path (27) is highly instrument-specific which highlights
that the interpretation as an effective allowance supply function is illustrative at best. In
contrast to the allowance supply function specified in Section 4.1 it is not a common and
defining feature of the carbon-pricing scheme but specific to the overlapping policy under
consideration. Hence, if several such policies are considered simultaneously, either by the
same or different jurisdictions, each faces its own equilibrium expansion path. Plugging
(27) into Equation (17) yields the same W as using (23).
To advise policymakers on the climate benefit of an overlapping policy within a carbon
market that adjusts the cap based on past allowance banking such as the EU ETS, one
needs to compute a separate effective supply curve for each and every variant of the
policy—and they differ in fundamental ways based on seemingly minor differences such
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as the exact time profile of reductions in aggregate allowance demand.
The allowance supply function interpretation also highlights an inherent instability
induced by combining overlapping policies with a carbon-market design like the reformed
EU ETS. They have the potential to generate downward-sloping effective supply curves
and hence multiplicity of equilibria and essentially erratic responses. The latter are most
obvious for cases when the slopes of supply and demand curves are similar and neither
strictly convex nor strictly concave.33
Summarising our analysis, Figure 3 presents the possible ranges of the waterbed effect
for typical carbon-market designs captured by Propositions 4 and 5.34 While the extent
of the waterbed is unique for a carbon tax (W = 0) and cap-and-trade (W = 1), all
hybrid policies and flexibility mechanisms yield ranges that depend on the specifics of the
carbon-market design, the probability that any price bounds are binding (π), the scale
and timing of the overlapping policy, or the long and short-run elasticity of emissions
demand.
Figure 3: Waterbed effects for typical carbon-pricing policies
Notes: The expected (but not the ex-post) waterbed effect of a marginal overlapping policy in a cap-
and-trade scheme with a price corridor depends on the probability that price bounds are binding (π).
33Existence of equilibria is typically not an issue. For any history of emissions there is a unique cap.
The allowance supply in period 2 is always perfectly price-inelastic. The “effective supply curve” is an
equilibrium expansion path, i.e., its mere existence requires that an equilibrium exists.
34Note that Propositions 4 and 5 apply to policies announced at the beginning of period 1. Due to
the design of both types of flexibility mechanisms—both respond to market outcomes in period 1—an
unanticipated policy implemented in period 2 has a waterbed effect of W = 1. It simply escapes the
radar of the flexibility mechanism.
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4.3 The reformed EU ETS
To further address subtleties with respect to the timing of overlapping policies, we now
take a closer look in a many-period context at the reformed EU ETS. We also show how
to compute ∂s/∂b and an instantaneous waterbed effect in this context—where ∂s/∂b
is not explicitly specified by the market rules but rather is the result of an interaction
between the rules and (future) market outcomes.
The EU ETS’s flexibility mechanism, the Market Stability Reserve (MSR), works as
follows.35 If the bank, known as the “total number of allowances in circulation” (TNAC)
in the legal language of the EU ETS, exceeds 833 million at the end of a given year (in 2017
or later), then the number of allowances auctioned in the 12 months following October
of the following year (but not before January 2019) is reduced by a certain percentage
of the size of the bank (see Table 1). Allowances withheld are placed in the MSR and
released in installments of 100 million/year once the bank has dropped below 400 million.
We label tB=833 the year in which the bank drops below the 833 million threshold and the
MSR hence stops taking in allowances.
Year Intake rate
(if bank > 833 million on Dec. 31st) (%)
2017 16∗
2018 - 2021 24
2021 - tB=833 12
Table 1: Intake rates for the EU ETS Market Stability Reserve (MSR)
∗ Two-thirds of 24 percent because the withdrawals that would be due in Oct.-Dec. 2018 do not materialise
as the MSR is instituted at the beginning of 2019 (European Commission, 2018).
Starting in 2023, the maximum number of allowances held in the MSR is limited to the
number auctioned in the previous year.36 Allowances in excess of this upper bound are
permanently cancelled. Given that the MSR is seeded with a large quantity of allowances
and that the threshold for cancellations is decreasing along with the number of auctioned
allowances, any additional allowance drawn into the MSR is eventually cancelled.37
Computation of the waterbed effect for the EU ETS faces several challenges. First,
the MSR’s intake rate changes over time (Table 1). Second, the MSR is active over
multiple periods so the cumulative effect of an early shift in allowance demand depends
on its impact on the bank in all future periods up to the point at which the TNAC drops
35The rules are laid down in European Parliament and Council (2018) and discussed by Perino (2018).
36The target share of auctioning in Phase 4 is 57% (European Parliament and Council, 2018) with the
remaining allowances being freely allocated.
37At the end of 2019 the MSR contained 1.3 billion allowances with a further 332.5 million being added
before September 2021 (European Commission, 2020). The cancellation threshold in 2023 will be below
1 billion.
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below 833 million. Third, the point in time at which this threshold is reached is itself
determined by market outcomes and hence by the overlapping policy itself.38 Fourth,
the size of the indirect price-mediated Rosendahl effect of anticipated future changes in
allowance demand depends on the same dynamics. These complexities imply that W can
only be estimated by numerical simulation.39
To illustrate some of these intricacies, we compute the sensitivity of the long-run cap
to changes in the bank ∂s/∂b. Based on this we derive an instantaneous waterbed effect
that captures only the first two complexities: the MSR’s time-varying intake rate and the
uncertain multi-period nature of its activity. An instantaneous change in the number of
banked allowances triggers a sequence of transfers to the MSR. Only a share νt of the
increase in the bank is transferred in the first year, the remainder (1 − νt) adds to the
bank in the following year and again induces a transfer at rate νt+1, i.e., (1− νt)νt+1, and
so on. This implies (see Appendix B for proof):
Lemma 1 Adding one allowance to the bank in year t and with the bank dropping below
833 million allowances in year tB=833, the effective sensitivity of the long-run cap (∂s/∂b)
in the EU ETS is given by:
∂
∂b
s (t, tB=833) = −(1− .16)max[0,min[2018,tB=833]−max[2017,t]] (28)
× (1− .24)max[0,min[2022,tB=833]−max[2018,t]]
× (1− .12)max[0,max[2022,tB=833]−max[2022,t]].
The instantaneous waterbed effect Ŵ (ta, t, tB=833) in response to a one-off reduction in
aggregate allowance demand in year t that is announced in year ta ≤ t is thus:












Abstracting from changes in the carbon price ((∂eta/∂τta)/(∂e/∂τta) = 0), this simplifies
to:
Ŵ (t, tB=833) |τfixed = 1 +
∂
∂b
s (t, tB=833) . (30)
Lemma 1 highlights the triple importance of timing: the year an overlapping policy
is announced, ta, the year it shifts allowance demand, t, and the year the carbon-pricing
38Further increasing complexity, Gerlagh et al. (2019) show that the mechanism creates multiple
equilibria.
39See Bruninx et al. (2019); Gerlagh et al. (2019); Pahle et al. (2019); Rosendahl (2019a) for simulation
results and Rosendahl (2019b); Perino (2019) for informal discussions.
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scheme stops responding to past market outcomes, t833, jointly determine the size of the
instantaneous waterbed effect. Note that this still ignores the endogeneity of t833 and that
most overlapping policies shift allowance demand in several years (see Section 4.1).
5 Illustrations of unilateral overlapping policies
There are many real-world unilateral policies that overlap with wider carbon-pricing sys-
tems, leading to different degrees of waterbed effects and internal carbon leakage. We now
illustrate how several such overlapping policies fit into our model’s conceptual framework
from Section 2. The equilibrium change in long-run emissions is ∆e∗ = [1−Li][1−W ]∆ei,
and our main outcome of interest here is the effective emissions reduction rate Ri ≡
[1 − Li][1 −W ]. We use a combination of sources to quantify leakage and waterbed ef-
fects, which allows us to compute Ri for a range of policies. (A limitation is that our
sources do not provide time-varying estimates of internal carbon leakage, hence we leave
out the t subscript for Li (and we sometimes leave out subscripts altogether for ease of
exposition).)
Figure 4 is the visual summary of this section. It plots the contour lines of R in
(L,W )-space along with various policy examples for which we have found estimates of
L and W using existing literature. This is a novel way to graphically summarise the
climate-effectiveness of a rich array of overlapping policies. Policies in the green regions are
highly effective; policies in the darker orange regions have little effect, or worse, increase
aggregate emissions. The evidence is consistent with the predictions from our theory of
internal carbon leakage: a unilateral carbon price floor, aviation tax, and coal phase-out
have positive leakage (Propositions 1 and 2) while renewables support has negative leakage
(Proposition 3). The following subsections explain the various overlapping policies in more
detail, first for those overlapping the EU ETS and then for those in North America.
5.1 Overlapping policies in the EU ETS
We first consider policies overlapping the reformed EU ETS for which the waterbed effect
depends on the timing of the policies—a result of the flexibility mechanism based on
past allowance banking (the MSR). As discussed in Section 4.3, the eventual impact of
a marginal change in the allowance bank in year t on overall EU ETS emissions—and
thus the “instantaneous waterbed effect” Ŵt for a fixed carbon price path referred to
in Equation (30) in Lemma 1—changes over time. Therefore, the effective emissions
reduction rate for policies in the EU ETS changes over time, and we refer to it as R̂it =
(1− Li)(1− Ŵt).
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Figure 4: Unilateral policies facing internal carbon leakage and a waterbed effect
A: Dutch flight tax
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Notes: Figure shows the contour plot of the effective emissions reduction rate Rit = (1−Lit)(1−W ) of
various policies discussed in this section. Solid black lines indicate the contour lines where Rit = 0 (when
L = 1 or W = 1) and Rit = 1 (bottom left). For EU ETS policies, we plot the instantaneous waterbed
effect Ŵt for a fixed carbon-price path. Dashed grey arrows indicate that, in the EU ETS, a policy’s R̂it
moves towards zero as t approaches tB=833 and Ŵt → 1. We assume tB=833 = 2030. Solid grey arrows
show specific shifts in time for the German renewable energy support schemes and for a proposed regional
carbon price floor.
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As given by Equation (28), Ŵt depends on the year t in which the policy takes effect
and the number of years until the bank drops below 833 million allowances, tB=833. We
use tB=833 = 2030 as a lower-end mid-range value
40 and contrast policies acting in years
t = 2020, 2025 and 2030. In a sensitivity analysis, we also consider tB=833 = 2048, as
estimated in Gerlagh et al. (2019). As time moves on, Ŵt increases from 0.21 to 0.53
to 1 and all European policies in Figure 4 move north, as indicated by the dotted lines.
The values for Ŵt can be calculated using Equation (28) evaluated at tB=833 = 2030
and t = 2020, 2025, 2030. The internal leakage rate Li is policy specific and we discuss
empirical estimates for various policies below. Note that Figure 4 shows a sequence of
emissions reduction rates for policies operating in different years. The overall performance
of a policy that is in effect for multiple years can be summarised by the emissions-reduction
weighted average over the values of R̂it along the grey lines for the relevant time period.
We finally note that the policies that we highlight below (e.g., a carbon price floor,
a coal phase-out, an aviation tax, or renewables support) likely have negligible external
carbon leakage to regions outside the EU ETS, justifying our focus on internal leakage.
“Supply-side” unilateral policies
Following the structure of Section 3.1, we now discuss “supply-side” unilateral policies
such as national carbon price floors, aviation taxes, and low-carbon mandates.
Electricity
We first consider unilateral cost-raising policies such as a national carbon price floor (CPF)
for electricity generation. For example, the Dutch government announced a national CPF
for the electricity sector in 2018 and is awaiting a final vote in parliament as of the fall
of 2020. It is slated to increase from EUR 12.30/tCO2 in 2020 to EUR 31.90/tCO2 in
2030. In 2013, Great Britain introduced a carbon fee for its power sector. Proposition 1
shows that such policies, if binding, suffer from intra-EU leakage as domestic generation
gets replaced with imports. We expect high leakage for small countries (high σj) that are
strongly interconnected to neighbours with flexible yet dirty supply (high εSj , θj/θi).
Consistent with this, recent estimates find L ' 0.85 for the Dutch CPF, while a
regional CPF including the Benelux, France and Germany faces L = 0.61 (Frontier Eco-
nomics, 2018; Vollebergh, 2018).41 Such CPFs in small interconnected countries are un-
40This date is subject to substantial uncertainty, with estimates ranging from 2020 (Perino, 2018) to
the second half of the 2030s (Quemin and Trotignon, 2018), and tB = 833 = 2030 as a mid-range value
(Vollebergh, 2018).
41Table 1 in Frontier Economics (2018) estimates that the Dutch price floor will reduce domestic
emissions by 26 million tCO2 in 2030, but the net EU-wide emissions reduction is only 4 million tCO2,
implying L = 0.85. Vollebergh (2018) estimates internal carbon leakage to be 85% for the Dutch price
floor and 61% for a regional CPF including the Benelux, France and Germany.
31
likely to reduce EU-wide emissions by much, with R̂2020 = 0.12 (Ŵ2020 = 0.21, L = 0.85)
even under the punctured waterbed (see Figure 4).42 As more countries join the CPF,
R̂2020 rises to 0.31 (Ŵ2020 = 0.21, L = 0.61). Furthermore, the solid grey arrow shows
that the regional CPF’s R̂ decreases to 0.18 by 2025 when Ŵ2025 = 0.53, so early action
is preferable.
Cost-raising policies can backfire if imports are substantially dirtier than domestic
production (see Proposition 1). We plot a hypothetical “CPF with dirty imports” for
which L = 1.33 such that EU-wide emissions increase, R < 0.43 Since this policy lies
to the right of the R = 0 contour line, the negative effect gets weaker over time as the
waterbed effect gets stronger.
Mandates to reduce carbon-intensive production in the electricity sector are also
supply-side policies (Proposition 2). Examples include the British and Dutch policies
to close their remaining coal-fired power plants by 2025 and 2030, respectively. Germany
has also passed regulation to phase out coal by 2038.44 This would lead to reduced de-
mand for allowances both before and after this date, relative to the counterfactual.45 The
policy has been estimated to have an internal carbon leakage rate of 55% in 2020 (Pahle
et al., 2019), so R̂2020 = 0.36 (Ŵ2020 = 0.21, L = 0.55) and decreasing to zero by 2030.
Post-2030, Ŵt = 1, so all unilateral policies within the EU ETS end up at R = 0.
Aviation
As another example policy, several European countries, such as Austria, Germany, Norway
and Sweden, have aviation taxes. Others, such as Denmark, Ireland and the Netherlands,
abolished them after initial implementation. Such policies are prone to leakage: when the
Netherlands adopted an aviation tax in July 2008 at a rate of EUR 11.25 for short-haul
flights and EUR 45 for long-haul flights, about 50% of the decline in passengers at Dutch
airports was offset by increased passenger volumes at nearby airports in Belgium and
Germany (Gordijn and Kolkman, 2011).46 This intra-EU leakage rate of 50% is in line
42We expect internal carbon leakage to be lower for Great Britain’s carbon fee as import supply is
more inelastic due to interconnection constraints, but we are not aware of any empirical estimates.
43We assume θj/θi = 2, ε
S
j = 5⇔ ηSj = 0.2, σj = 0.2, εD = 0.5 and Ai = 0.
44Sources: https://www.bmwi.de/Redaktion/EN/Pressemitteilungen/2020/20200703-final-
decision-to-launch-the-coal-phase-out.html (press release), http://www.bgbl.de/xaver/
bgbl/start.xav?startbk=Bundesanzeiger_BGBl&jumpTo=bgbl120s1818.pdf (coal phase-out law),
https://www.wired.co.uk/article/germany-coal-electricity-spremberg (press coverage).
45The law also contains a provision for cancelling allowances. It is supposed to create a waterbed
effect of zero taking the MSR into account. However, the law assumes that the MSR induces a waterbed
effect strictly below 1 and ignores leakage effects. The numbers calculated in Equation (28) are before
cancellations are taken into account and hence can be used as an indication of how many allowances
would need to be cancelled in order to achieve W = 0.
46Gordijn and Kolkman (2011) estimate that the tax accounted for nearly two million fewer passengers
from Amsterdam’s Schiphol Airport during the period over which the tax was in effect, while an extra
one million Dutch passengers flew from foreign airports.
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with Proposition 1. As a result, the Dutch government abolished the tax in July 2009.
The Netherlands will reintroduce a modest ticket tax of EUR 7 on all flights starting in
January 2021 (Forbes, 2020a). Assuming the same internal leakage rate as in 2008-9, we
estimate R̂2020 = 0.40 (Ŵ2020 = 0.21, L = 0.50).
There is some broader evidence that aviation taxes are most likely in countries where
leakage is mitigated—e.g., in high-population countries such as France, Germany, Italy
and the United Kingdom (low σj) as well as countries such as Norway and Sweden whose
population is far away from low-tax airports abroad (high εSj ) (PricewaterhouseCoopers,
2017). Austria is an exception given the proximity of Vienna to Bratislava. Greece,
Croatia and Latvia—countries that also have aviation taxes—are relatively small, though
their geographies are such that leakage may be less severe than for the Netherlands.
“Demand-side” unilateral policies
We now look at unilateral “demand-side” policies such as renewables support. Germany
and Spain have adopted some of the world’s most ambitious incentives for wind and so-
lar energy, which include feed-in tariffs and market premium programs. Consistent with
Proposition 3, Abrell et al. (2019) estimate negative carbon (and output) leakage as addi-
tional zero-carbon energy depresses wholesale electricity prices and offsets imported gas-
and coal-fired electricity in Germany (L = −0.50) and Spain (L = −0.12).47 Similarly,
a German government report finds L = −0.65 (Klobasa and Sensfuss, 2016). Figure 4
shows that, at least in the year 2020, the renewable support scheme in Germany reduces
system-wide emissions considerably (Ŵ2020 = 0.21, L = −0.50, R̂2020 = 1.19); in fact, by
more than the domestic emissions reduction in Germany. As time passes, W increases
and eventually the puncture is sealed, reducing R to zero from 2030 onwards.
Proposition 3 showed equivalence between renewables support and other demand-side
policies such as energy-efficiency programs and a carbon-consumption tax. Therefore, we
expect negative internal leakage also for these policies but are not aware of any empirical
estimates, so do not include them in Figure 4.
47In their Table 3, Abrell et al. (2019) report d(import quantity)/d(policy) and d(domestic quan-
tity)/d(policy), from which we calculate output leakage as -78%, -77%, -7% and -21% for German wind,
German solar, Spanish wind and Spanish solar, respectively. Similarly, we compute carbon leakage from
their Table 5: -49%, -50%, -6% and -19%, respectively. Averaged over wind and solar, we use L = −0.50
for Germany and L = −0.12 for Spain in Figure 4. Schnaars (2019) provides an even more negative
carbon leakage rate of -73%, further bolstering the case for negative leakage. The differences between
output and emissions leakage in Germany and Spain suggest that the marginal unit of output reduction
in Germany is approximately 50% more carbon intensive than the marginal reduction for its trading
partners; for Spain the emissions intensity of these marginal units are about equal. Abrell et al. (2019)
show that the German power mix is indeed dirtier than Spain’s.
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Sensitivity to tB=833 and the Rosendahl effect
So far, we have assumed the MSR will stop taking in allowances in 2030 (tB=833 = 2030).
In Figure 5, Panel (b), we investigate how the effective emissions reduction rate changes
when we assume tB=833 = 2048 (following Gerlagh et al. (2019)). Panel (c) shows the
performance of two key policies—renewable energy support and a coal phase-out in
Germany—when we consider the instantaneous waterbed effect without holding carbon
prices fixed and thus allowing for the Rosendahl effect (see Equation (29) in Lemma 1).
We use Gerlagh et al. (2019)’s estimates of the Rosendahl effect but note that estimates
in the literature differ and this is a highly active area of research.
Panel (b) of Figure 5 shows that, compared to our original estimates in Panel (a),
the instantaneous waterbed effect decreases substantially when tB=833 lies further in the
future. The waterbed effect can only go below 100% if the MSR takes in allowances; if
allowances still flow into the MSR in the 2030s and 2040s, then Ŵt < 1 for many more
years over which policies operate. In Panel (a), Ŵ2030 = 1; in Panel (b), Ŵ2030 falls by an
order of magnitude.
Panel (c) compares Ŵt holding carbon prices fixed (grey arrows and dots) with en-
dogenous allowance prices (black arrows and dots). A black dot should be interpreted as
a policy announced in 2020 but expected to reduce the demand for emissions allowances
in year t ≥ 2020. The Rosendahl effect increases Ŵt substantially, especially for years
close to tB=833. Until the mid-2030s, the waterbed effect is still relatively limited (below
0.5) but in or after the year 2048, the waterbed effect is larger than 1. This is consistent
with Proposition 5 and highlights the potential unintended consequences of announcing
policies that reduce emissions demand far into the future.
5.2 Overlapping policies in North America
We now turn to discussing examples of unilateral carbon policies in North America, two
of which are plotted in Figure 4. Recall from Section 4.1 that the waterbed can also be
punctured due to the stochastic nature of when a carbon price corridor is binding. A
cap-and-trade system in which the carbon price trades at an auction price floor or cap
has W = 0 while in the intermediate price range W = 1. The expected waterbed effect
that applies to an overlapping policy thus depends on the probability that the auction
price floor or cap is binding in a given year. The higher the probability that the system
will trade at the price floor or cap, the more effective the puncture (Figure 3, policy 3).
This feature is relevant for the two carbon markets in the United States.
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Figure 5: Leakage and waterbed effects in the EU ETS under varying assumptions
A: Dutch flight tax
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(a) tB=833 = 2030; no Rosendahl effect
A: Dutch flight tax
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(b) tB=833 = 2048; no Rosendahl effect
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(c) tB=833 = 2048; with Rosendahl effect
Notes: Panel (a) presents Figure 4 excluding policies outside the EU ETS. Panel (b) plots the same
policies assuming tB=833 = 2048 instead of tB=833 = 2030. Panel (c) adds the Rosendahl effect as
estimated in Gerlagh et al. (2019), together with their estimate of tB=833 = 2048.
35
California-Québec carbon trading
California and Québec have a joint carbon market with an auction price floor ($16.68 in
2020) and, in a proposal to take effect in 2021, a price ceiling of $61.25 (Politico, 2018).
During periods when the auction price floor binds—which it did in various auctions in the
year 201648—the unsold allowances are first placed in a holding account, from which they
are re-introduced after two consecutive sold-out auctions (subject to a 25% volume limit
per auction). If unsold for 24 months, they are moved to the Allowance Price Containment
Reserve (APCR). In the case of the proposed price floor, the APCR will be practically
infinite (i.e., the threshold for releasing allowances is very high) so moving allowances
into the APCR is essentially the same as retiring them. Borenstein et al. (2017) report a
post-reform estimate of 47% (34%) that the price floor (ceiling) binds. Thus, in expected
terms, W = 1− 0.47− 0.34 = 0.19.
The California-Québec carbon market is known to cause external leakage to neigh-
bouring states that are interconnected in the electricity market (Fowlie, 2009; Caron et
al., 2015). We now consider a counterfactual Western Climate Initiative (WCI) in which
states surrounding California join the carbon market.49 If California then imposed a uni-
lateral carbon top-up fee, this would lead to “intra-WCI” carbon leakage to neighbouring
states. Thus external leakage under the current system gets transformed into internal
leakage under a counterfactual WCI, allowing us to rely on existing estimates from the
literature. Fowlie (2009) finds that a carbon price in California that exempts out-of-state
producers achieves only 25-35% of the total emissions reductions achieved under com-
plete regulation (Arizona, Nevada, New Mexico, Oregon, Utah and Washington) so that
L = 0.65-0.75. Caron et al. (2015) provide a relevant leakage estimate of L = 0.09 for
California’s cap-and-trade program assuming that—as the current market rules specify—
there is a border-tax adjustment and “resource shuffling” is banned.50 Figure 4 plots the
hypothetical California carbon top-up fee using L = 0.09, as this estimate corresponds
most closely to California’s current market rules. Given these values, the overlapping
policy would be reasonably climate effective: for every ton of carbon saved in California,
system-wide emissions decrease by R = 0.74 tons (W = 0.19, L = 0.09).
48In addition, in many other quarterly auctions, the markets cleared only slightly above the price
ceiling. See https://ww3.arb.ca.gov/cc/capandtrade/capandtrade.htm for details.
49The WCI (http://www.wci-inc.org/) started in 2007 as an initiative by the governors of Arizona,
California, New Mexico, Oregon and Washington with a goal to develop a regional multi-sector cap-and-
trade market. Most states left during the economic downturn in the early 2010s but the idea of regional
carbon trading has recently resurfaced in discussions among states.
50Resource shuffling is defined as “any plan, scheme, or artifice to receive credit based on emissions
reductions that have not occurred, involving the delivery of electricity to the California grid” (Caron
et al., 2015). For example, out-of-state generators could reconfigure transmission so that low-carbon
electricity is diverted to California and high-carbon electricity is sold to other states.
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Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative
The Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative (RGGI) that caps CO2 emissions from electricity
in ten Northeastern states has a price floor which was binding during 2010-2012;51 the
states decided to retire unsold allowances in such cases. Allowances currently trade at
higher prices and the policy also has a price ceiling. Several RGGI states have floated the
idea of unilateral policies; most notably, New York has proposed an additional carbon fee
equal to the difference between the social cost of carbon and the RGGI allowance price,
which would apply in-state and to imported electricity from other RGGI states (Forbes,
2020b). This policy is somewhat different from the ones we have examined in our theory—
there is a border tax and external leakage to non-RGGI states may be nontrivial due to
the interconnectedness of the power grid.
Shawhan et al. (2019) estimate the emissions leakage to other RGGI states and to
non-RGGI states that results from New York’s policy and find that this depends heavily
on whether the cost of renewables is relatively low or high vs. natural gas—the former
leading to lower RGGI allowance prices. They find emissions leakage to other RGGI
states of L = 0.58 under the low-cost renewables scenario, but a negative leakage rate of
L = −0.42 when the relative cost of renewables is high. They also estimate the external
carbon leakage from New York to non-RGGI states at L = −1.55 and L = 0.04 for the
low and high renewable cost scenarios, respectively.52 This underscores that external and
internal leakage are distinct phenomena that can even have different signs, and that careful
empirical estimates of internal carbon leakage are essential for assessing the effectiveness
of unilateral policies.53 The border tax moves the carbon-pricing policy away from the
setting of Proposition 1 towards Proposition 3 where it reduces emissions both inside and
outside jurisdiction i—hence leakage can be negative. We do not plot New York’s carbon
fee in Figure 4 as we are not aware of an empirical estimate of the fraction of the time
that the system is expected to trade at the price floor or ceiling, so W is missing.
51See https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R41836.pdf
52The reason for the difference is that the carbon fee increases non-emitting generation in New York.
In the low-cost scenario this increase is quite substantial and reduces dirty imports from non-RGGI to
RGGI states, causing negative external leakage. With the high-cost assumptions the carbon fee reduces
emitting generation in other RGGI states, causing negative internal leakage (but there is little effect on
imports to RGGI from the rest of the Eastern Interconnection).
53We further note that Fell and Maniloff (2018) estimate carbon leakage from the introduction of
RGGI as a whole. They find substantial positive external leakage (L = 0.51) from RGGI to non-RGGI
states. As this is a very different policy than New York’s proposed carbon price—it operates in a larger
region and does not have a border-tax adjustment—we have no a priori reason to expect that external
leakage rates for these policies would be similar.
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Canada’s national minimum carbon tax
Canada adopted a national minimum carbon tax of $20 per ton starting in 2019, increasing
to $50 by 2022. Some provinces, such as Alberta and British Columbia, already had in
place carbon taxes with a price above the national minimum level. Such unilateral carbon
taxes face no waterbed effect (Proposition 4(ii)) but may suffer from internal leakage to
other provinces. Though we are not aware of direct leakage estimates, Murray and Rivers
(2015) and Yamazaki (2017) find that British Columbia’s carbon tax has had negligible
or modest effects on the aggregate economy, suggesting leakage is modest, and so Figure
4 plots this policy assuming L = 0.25 and W = 0, leaving a higher carbon tax in British
Columbia reasonably climate-effective (R = 0.75).
6 Conclusion
This paper has presented a new modelling framework—based on internal carbon leakage
and waterbed effects—to understand the impacts of overlapping climate policies within
a wider carbon-pricing system. Design matters in that different policy types have very
different leakage properties. Space matters as internal leakage rates can differ substantially
across industries and countries. Time matters as it affects the magnitude of the waterbed
effect. Our results provide policy-relevant guidance on the climate benefits of 25 different
combinations of unilateral policies and types of carbon-pricing systems.
The issues we have highlighted are critical for the design of new climate policies and ex-
tend beyond policy-making in Europe and North America. The ongoing design of China’s
national cap-and-trade system—and, in particular, the extent to which it will feature
a waterbed effect—will greatly affect how effective additional province-level climate ac-
tion will be. A carbon price floor would strengthen the market design by preventing
an inefficiently-low price and may puncture the waterbed; subnational governments then
ought to think carefully about selecting unilateral policies with limited internal leakage.
More empirical estimates of internal leakage could substantially improve policy-making.
Over time, as carbon pricing is adopted by additional jurisdictions and international
carbon markets become increasingly linked, the issue of internal carbon leakage may
become even more salient. Imagine a future with a global carbon-pricing system. Suppose
that one country or region, say the EU, wishes to push harder on decarbonisation of an
individual sector, say steel. Depending on the nature of competition in steel, there may be
“internal” leakage to non-EU jurisdictions. This unilateral EU policy will also experience
a global waterbed effect: zero under a global carbon tax but potentially large under
global cap-and-trade. With appropriate reinterpretation, our results can help understand
the impacts of overlapping policies in a future with a more global carbon-pricing system.
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Appendix A: Proofs of results on internal carbon leak-
age
General results (non-separable cost functions)
In this appendix, we derive three results, Propositions 1A–3A, on internal carbon leak-
age using a general cost function Gk(xk, ak) for k = i, j. The separable cost function
Gk(xk, ak) ≡ [Ck(xk) +φk(ak)] from the main text is nested where Gxak (xk, ak) = 0 so that
Propositions 1–3 will follow as simple corollaries. Standing assumptions are Gxk, G
a
k > 0
and Gxxk , G
aa
k > 0 so G
aa
k →∞ means that additional abatement is infeasible (correspond-
ing to Ak = 0 in our simple model).
As in the main text, firm k’s emissions are ek = e
0
k − ak where ak is abatement
and e0k = θkxk is baseline emissions. To maximise profits, firm k solves maxxk,ak Πk =
pxk −Gk(xk, ak)− τkek. The first-order conditions are:




Let Mk(xk; ak) ≡ [Gxk + θkGak] be k’s optimal marginal cost of output, given its optimal
choice of abatement with τk = G
a
k. We assume that this optimised cost increases with








This condition is trivially met for a separable cost function (with Gxak = 0) and, more
generally, is satisfied if either Gxak ≥ 0 or Gxak < 0 but not too negative. Intuitively, the
condition limits the degree of cost complementarity between output and abatement such
that there is “no free lunch”.







The separable case from the main text is nested where ψk = 0 while ψk < 1 again follows




[−p′ +Gxxk (1− ψk)]
∈ (0, 1)
where µk < 1 is satisfied because of stability of equilibrium, ψk < 1. Armed with these
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preliminaries, we now derive generalisations of the results from the main text.
Proposition 1A. With non-separable cost functions, a unilateral carbon price by country


















where the rate of output leakage is LOi = µj ∈ (0, 1).
Proof of Proposition 1A. Since i’ s carbon price τi = τi(τ, λi) under a unilateral carbon







































































We now proceed in two main steps. First, we derive equilibrium changes in output levels.
Second, we derive changes in emissions—and hence the rate of internal carbon leakage.






















using the definitions of ψk and δk. Writing this two-equation system in more compact

















































= µj ∈ (0, 1)
which is always positive but less than 100% by stability. Emissions changes and output




















































































It will be useful to rewrite the last term as follows. First, recalling the definition µk ≡













−p′ +Gxxj (1− ψj)
































Using these terms in the expression for internal carbon leakage yields the result as claimed.
Proposition 2A. A unilateral reduction in carbon-intensive production by country i has








where the rate of output leakage is LOi = µj ∈ (0, 1).
Proof of Proposition 2A. A unilateral reduction in carbon-intensive production by
country i is represented as dxi/dλi < 0. The common carbon price remains unchanged,
τi = τj = τ . This problem has the same structure as that underlying Proposition 1A—
except that i’s output change dxi/dλi < 0 is determined by policy directly rather than
induced in equilibrium by a unilateral carbon price. The remaining choices—abatement by
i and output and abatement by j—remain optimal by the respective first-order conditions.



























































= µj ∈ (0, 1)
which is always positive but less than 100% by stability, exactly as in Proposition 1A.
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which is a special case of the expression in Proposition 1A, as claimed.
Proposition 3A. The unilateral policies by country i of (i) a renewables support program
that brings in additional zero-carbon production, (ii) an energy-efficiency program that
reduces demand for carbon-intensive production, and (iii) a carbon-consumption tax have











where the rate of output leakage is LOi = −
µj/(1−µj)
µi/(1−µi) < 0.
Proof of Proposition 3A. As explained in the main text, all three of these demand-side
unilateral policies are modeled via their impact on the demand curve, with ∂
∂λi
p(X;λi) <
0. The common carbon price remains unchanged, τi = τj = τ . Thus differentiating i’s




































































We again proceed in two main steps. First, we derive equilibrium changes in output levels.
Second, we derive changes in emissions—and hence the rate of internal carbon leakage.











−p′ +Gxxj (1− ψj)
]
.









[−p′ +Gxxi (1− ψi)]
using the definition of ψk.






















































which is always negative.









Using j’s equilibrium output response, its first-order condition for abatement, and the



















































Specific results (separable cost functions)
We here state Propositions 1–3 as simple corollaries of Propositions 1A–3A. The separable
cost function Gk(xk, ak) ≡ [Ck(xk) + φk(ak)] is nested within the general model where
Gxak (xk, ak) = 0. The general model then simplifies with δk = 1, ψk = 0 as well as
µk = (−p′)/(−p′ + C ′′k ) ∈ (0, 1) (for k = i, j).
To present expressions for internal carbon leakage in terms of simple demand and
supply elasticities, we begin with two preliminary results. First, using the price elas-





k(xk) > 0, where Ĉ
′
k(xk) ≡ [C ′k(xk) + τkθk = p(X)] and Ĉ ′′k (xk) ≡ C ′′k (xk), we
can rewrite the cost term as follows:
























where the last expression uses the definition of k’s market share, σk ≡ xk/X ∈ (0, 1), and
ηSk = 1/ε
S




(−p′ + C ′′k )
=
σk
(σk + εD/εSk )
> 0.
Proposition 1 (Separable cost functions). A unilateral carbon price by country i has













Proof of Proposition 1. The expression for internal carbon leakage from Proposition
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Using the two preliminary results and recalling the definition of k’s abatement opportunity








k], yields the result as claimed.
Proposition 2 (Separable cost functions). A unilateral reduction in carbon-intensive





(σj + εD/εSj )
.












Using the relationship µj = σj/(σj + ε
D/εSj ) yields the result as claimed.
Proposition 3 (Separable cost functions). The unilateral policies by country i of (i)
a renewables support program that brings in additional zero-carbon production, (ii) an
energy-efficiency program that reduces demand for carbon-intensive production, and (iii)
































yields the result as claimed.
Appendix B: Proof of results on waterbed effects
Derivation of Equation (14)

























and substituting the slope of the allowance demand curve ∂et
∂τt
for the


























= (1 + r)∂e2
∂τ2
yields Equation (14).
Proof of part iii) of Proposition 4

































Derivation of Equation (21)



























































Proof of Corollary 1



























































Next we derive the equilibrium expansion path by relating changes in the equilibrium
allowance supply to changes in the equilibrium allowance price that are induced by the


















































It now remains to be shown that Propositions 4 and 5 are equivalent. To see this substitute























Note that W ∈ [0, 1] only holds for weakly upward-sloping allowance supply curves. This
is no longer guaranteed once we substitute in Equation (27). Both values below 0 and
above 1 are now possible. Dividing the above equation by − ∂e
∂τ1
























β in the denominator to obtain Equation (23).
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Proof of Lemma 1
Equation (28) follows directly from the parameters presented in Table 1 and the expla-
nation given in the paragraph preceding the Lemma. See also Perino (2018).
The instantaneous waterbed effect Ŵ (ta, t, tB=833) measures the waterbed effect of a
reduction in allowance demand in a single year (t). Hence, the β measuring the temporal
distribution of a policy’s impact that appears in Equation (23) is equal to 1. Since we
now consider a setting with more than two periods and the time of announcement of the
overlapping policy is no longer fixed, we need to explicitly take this into account. In
a market with perfect intertemporal arbitrage prices will respond to the announcement
of a policy ta. The denominator of Equation (23) capturing the price effect is therefore
adjusted accordingly.
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